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Posthumous Assisted Reproduction 
Background 
The practice of freezing gametes and embryos has raised a new set of moral and legal questions.  In the 
1950s it became possible to freeze sperm to be thawed later and used to fertilize an egg.  Frozen ova and 
embryo cryopreservation became common after the dawn of in vitro fertilization.  It is now possible for a 
conception and/or implantation of an embryo to occur after the death of one or both of the gamete 
donors.  When considering the law and ethics surrounding this issue, it is important to consider the 
intent of the decedent.   
Issues 
Does the decedent have a property interest in his or her gametes such that they can be considered 
inheritable property? 
Should clear intent of the decedent to procreate posthumously be required? If so, what is the standard to 
prove consent? 
Case Law 
Parpaliax v. CECOS, Trib. Gr. Inst. Creteil, Gazette du Palais (G.P.), Sep. 15, 1984 
Summary 
Alain Parpalaix was diagnosed with testicular cancer. He deposited nine vials of sperm in the Center 
d’Etude et de Conservation du Sperme (CECOS) without specific instructions regarding its use before he 
began chemotherapy treatment.  Alain married Corrine two days before his death.  CEOCOS denied 
Corrine access to the samples.  She had requested them with the intent of using them to conceive a child.  
Parpalaix and Property 
The court rejected the idea that sperm should be considered an ordinary moveable property interest.  
Instead, sperm was described as “the seed of life… tied to fundamental liberty of a human being to 
conceive or not to conceive.”   
Parpalaix and the Donor’s Intent 
The court determined that the donor’s intentions would be determinative in deciding whether the sperm 
could be used for procreation after his death.  However, the court did not clearly discuss the guidelines 
for determining the donor’s intent.  Here the court stated that Alain’s marriage to Corrine two days 
before his death demonstrated his intent to have Corrine inherit his sperm for procreation as well as the 
testimony of Alain’s parents that he did intend for Corrine to be the mother of his child either during or 
after his life.  The court did not find that a written contract was needed to demonstrate intent for 
posthumous reproduction.  
The court described this interest as an “interim” category of property that had “special respect because of 
its potential for human life.” 
Hecht v. Superior Court Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. App. 1993) 
Summary 
William E. Kane committed suicide;however, prior to his suicide, he deposited 15 vials of his sperm with 
California Cyrobank, Inc. in Los Angeles.  In his will, he bequeathed the sperm to his long-time girlfriend, 
Deborah Ellen Hecht. The will included specific instructions that he intended her to have the sperm to 
impregnate her, if she wished.  Kane’s two existing children from a previous marriage objected to the 
inheritance.   
Hecht and Property 
The court held that sperm being stored with the intent to be used for artificial insemination was unlike 
other human tissue because it was ‘gametic material’ that could be used for reproduction.  The court 
concluded that the decedent had a clear interest in the sperm and its use for reproduction and that that 
interest was sufficient to constitute ‘property’ within the meaning of the probate code.  
Hecht and the Donor’s Intent 
The court accepted the written instructions in Kane’s will as proving his intent to procreate 
posthumously.  
Policy 
American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) 
The Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, “Posthumous reproduction.” 
Fertility and Sterility, Vol. 82 (2004) 
The committee acknowledged that decisions regarding whether or not to have a child have been 
considered a private matter as well as a fundamental right of individual adults.  The committee, however, 
noted limited precedent on how the right is expressed or respected after death. 
The committee recommended that programs require donors to make their intentions regarding 
posthumous reproduction known prior to the donation.  If no decision has been made, the committee 
stated that “one would expect that in most instances this would preclude any posthumous use.”  The 
committee acknowledged situations in which, when one partner faces imminent death or chemotherapy 
for cancer, the couple will request to have gametes stored.  If this does occur, posthumous reproduction 
may be requested by the surviving partner.  The committee concluded that in these cases and other cases 
relating to posthumous reproduction “it is the responsibility of the specialist in assisted reproduction to 
insist on full disclosure to all participants, to ascertain that all appropriate informed consents are 
obtained, and to ensure adequate screening and counselling of all concerned parties.” 
European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE) 
Pennings, G., G. De Wert, et al. (2006). "ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law 11: posthumous assisted 
reproduction." Human Reproduction 21(12): 3050. 
The task force found that posthumous reproduction within the context of an existing parental project 
when preserved gametes were used by the surviving partner was acceptable in some situations.  The task 
force distinguished those situations from cases in which third parties request the use of embryos or 
gametes.  In third party cases, “the usual conditions of gamete and embryo donations apply” (relatives 
other than the intended parent should not receive special treatment).  
The task force identified two key concerns when considering the ethics of posthumous reproduction in 
the context of an existing parental project.  First, the task force considered autonomy and intent of the 
decedent and, secondly, they considered the well-being of the future child.  
The task force recommended a opting-in system over an opting-out system of providing consent for 
posthumous reproduction.  In the absence of written consent the existence of cryostored gametes or 
embryos only demonstrates the existence of a paternal project and does not prove the deceased’s 
acceptance of the continuation of the project after his or her death.  Members of the task force were split 
on the issue of whether explicit consent to continue the project after death was necessary.  The members 
who felt that explicit consent was not necessary developed a framework to consider in determining 
whether or not to contiue with the parental project.  They stipulated that the surviving partner could only 
use the gametes for his or her own reproduction, the gametes could not be donated for the use of others 
and that the gametes must be destroyed after the death of both parents.   
The task force considered different factors that might affect the future child’s well-being.  These included 
being raised in a one-parent family, possible stigmatization upon learning that he or she was conceived 
after death, the use of the surrogate, and being treated as a "commemorative child" or a symbolic 
replacement of the deceased by the surviving parent.  The task force decided the first three concerns 
created no substantial risk to the child and that extensive counselling could minimize any risk of the child 
being treated as "commemorative." 
The task force also considered the state of mind of the surviving parent and noted that the psychology of 
bereavement should be taken into account during the decision–making procedure.  Individuals 
undergoing the loss of a partner may be prompted to make hasty decisions influenced by feelings of guilt 
and idealization of the partner after a loss.  However, a waiting period of one year and counselling should 
ensure competent decisions.   
From a philosophical perspective, the task force noted that those who know that their desire to have 
children posthumously will be respected may experience increased quality of life and decreased anxiety 
about their family's future.  Similar considerations allow individuals to make decisions regarding organ 
donation and wills.  
The task force concluded that posthumous reproduction, in the context of a pre-existing parental project, 
should have: written consent provided by the deceased obtained at the time of storage or beginning of 
IVF cycle, counselling for the surviving partner during the decision-making process, and a minimum of a 
one year waiting period before treatment can be started.  
The Model Act Governing Assisted Reproduction Technologies (2008) 
Model Act Governing Assisted Reprod. Tech. (2008) available at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf. 
The model act provides guidance regarding whether or not children born from posthumous assisted 
reproduction are entitled to inheritance and social security benefits from the deceased genetic parent.  It 
addresses the requirement of intent of the deceased to procreate posthumously in determining 
parenthood and benefits to the child.  It does not, however, provide guidance on whether or not 
posthumous reproduction should be allowed. 
Studies 
Nakhuda, G. S., J. G. Wang, et al. "Posthumous assisted reproduction: a survey of attitudes of couples 
seeking fertility treatment and the degree of agreement between intimate partners." Fertility and 
Sterility(0).  
This study surveyed couples requesting infertility consultations.  The majority of participants (77.8%) 
responded that they would permit their spouse to harvest their gametes for the purpose of conceiving a 
child after their death and the majority (80.2%) responded that they believed their spouse would permit 
the use of their gametes for posthumous reproduction.  
 Summary 
Most of the case law and regulation surrounding issues of posthumous reproduction focus on the 
establishment of parenthood and the resulting inheritance and social security benefits of an already 
existing child.  Case law also exists regarding the retrieval of gametes posthumously.  Outside of Hecht, 
there is no or very little domestic case law or state regulation regarding the ability to engage in 
posthumous assisted reproduction using gametes stored prior to death. 
